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Necessity and language: in defence of conventionalism
Abstract
Kalhat has forcefully criticised Wittgenstein's linguistic or conventionalist account of logical necessity,
drawing partly on Waismann and Quine. I defend conventionalism against the charge that it cannot do
justice to the truth of necessary propositions, renders them unacceptably arbitrary or reduces them to
metalingustic statements. At the same time, I try to reconcile Wittgenstein's claim that necessary
propositions are constitutive of meaning with the logical positivists' claim that they are true by virtue of
meaning. Explaining necessary propositions by reference to linguistic conventions does not reduce
modal to non-modal notions, but it avoids metaphysical accounts, which are incapable of explaining
how we can have a priori knowledge of necessity.
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Necessity and Language: in defence of conventionalism 
Hans-Johann Glock, Universität Zürich 
Kalhat’s insightful paper is devoted to accounts of logical necessity proffered by Wittgenstein 
and defended by Baker and Hacker (1985), Schwyzer (2001) and myself (1996b; 2003). It 
challenges these accounts on two grounds. First, the attempt to explain logical necessity by 
appeal to linguistic rules or conventions fails; secondly, even if some such explanation were 
adequate, it would fail to be genuinely reductive of logical necessity, since normative notions 
presuppose modal notions.  
 I shall not take issue with Kalhat’s interpretation of Wittgenstein, which I regard as by 
and large correct. I also concede that he has pointed out serious lacunae and difficulties in the 
Wittgensteinian position. Nevertheless, I shall argue, he has not succeeded in demonstrating 
that linguistic or conventionalist accounts are hopeless. Furthermore, if a viable linguistic 
account of logical necessity can be provided, modal notions may not have been reduced to 
normative ones, but they will have been explained in terms that render them less mysterious. 
That is to say, the explanation will not rely on unexplained metaphysical necessities. 
 
1. The Wittgensteinian position 
Our topic is propositions which are logically rather than physically necessary. For 
Wittgenstein, these include the propositions of logic (e.g. those of the form ‘~ (p & ~p)’) and 
mathematics (e.g. ‘7 + 5 = 12), as well as analytic propositions, broadly conceived. The latter 
include definitional truths like 
(1) All bachelors are unmarried. 
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Kalhat succinctly summarizes Wittgenstein’s position. Like the logical positivists, 
Wittgenstein seeks to preserve a connection between (1) and the meaning of the word 
‘bachelor’. Verifying (1) requires attendance not to the marital status of men, but to the 
meaning of ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried’. By the same token, rejection of (1) betokens linguistic 
misunderstanding rather than factual ignorance. Unlike the logical positivists, Wittgenstein  
does not maintain that (1) follows from the meaning of its constituents; instead he maintains 
that (1) is partly constitutive of that meaning. According to Wittgenstein, (1) is a ‘grammatical 
proposition’. That is to say, it standardly expresses a rule for the correct use of at least one of 
those constituents, and thereby determines their meaning instead of following from it. By the 
same token, (1) has a normative status: it can be used to explain ‘bachelor’, and to criticize or 
justify one’s use of that term. It also draws a line between meaningful uses of that term and 
nonsense like ‘There is a married bachelor at the party’. 
 For Wittgenstein, this normative role of (1) explains its necessity. (1) cannot possibly 
be refuted by the facts, simply because no sentence contradicting it counts as a meaningful 
description of reality which is even in the running for stating a fact. To put it differently, in 
English no combination of words which contravenes (1) is truth-apt, i.e. counts as a statement 
or proposition that is even in the running for being true. At the same time, according to 
Wittgenstein language is ‘autonomous’ and grammatical rules like (1) are ‘arbitrary’. They do 
not mirror putative essences in reality, but constitute what might be called the essence or 
nature of bachelors. By the same token, they have the status of conventions. Although it is not 
up to individuals to alter grammatical rules, and although there can be reasons for adopting 
one grammar rather than another, we can in principle adopt different rules, and thereby accord 
a necessary alias normative status on different propositions. 
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2. Factual vs. Normative Truth 
An objection dating back to Waismann (1968: 66-7, 136-7) runs as follows: unlike necessary 
propositions, grammatical rules cannot be true or false. Kalhat recognizes that this objection is 
not compelling as it stands (see Glock 2003: 163-4). We do predicate truth of paradigmatic 
expressions of rules such as 
(2) The chess-king moves one square at a time  
But this means no more than that the rule to move the chess king one square at a time is in 
force. And according to Kalhat this ‘normative truth’ cannot account for crucial features of 
necessary propositions. For one thing, they can occur in conditional statements such as 
(3) If all bachelors are unmarried and Kant is a bachelor, then Kant is unmarried  
If (1) were normatively rather than factually true, however, (3) would be, in the words of von 
Wright, ‘a logical monster’.  Kalhat considers the response that one can mix factual with 
normative truth without creating logical monsters, as 
(4) If the chess-king moves one square at a time, then the move you have just made will 
not be accepted by the community of chess players 
He objects, however, that this is elliptical for 
(5)  If [The rule according to which the chess-king moves one square at a time is in force] 
then [The move you have just made will not be allowed by the community of chess 
players] 
We cannot treat (3) in an analogous fashion, Kalhat suggests. For that would deliver 
(6) If [the rule according to which the word ‘bachelor’ applies to men who are unmarried, 
is in force] and [Kant is a bachelor] then [Kant is unmarried] 
And this would render the conditional contingent and would ‘allow for a possibility that is 
otherwise (rightly) blocked’, namely that ‘while Kant is a bachelor, we cannot infer that Kant 
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is unmarried because the proposition ‘The rule according to which the word “bachelor” 
applies to men who are unmarried, is in force’ is false (pp. 9-11). 
 Unlike Kalhat, I do not regard this as an absurdity. If it is not a rule for the use of 
‘bachelor’ that the term applies exclusively to unmarried men, then we can indeed no longer 
infer from the fact that ‘bachelor’ applies to Kant that ‘unmarried’ applies to Kant. (3) is a 
tautology quite independently of the conceptual connection between ‘bachelor’ and 
‘unmarried’, and hence independently of the modal status of (1). That status reveals itself 
precisely in the fact that we do not need an additional piece of information to move from 
‘Kant is a bachelor’ to ‘Kant is unmarried’. By contrast, we would need an additional factual 
premises to move, e.g., from ‘Kant is a bachelor’ to ‘Kant is unhygienic’, in our case the 
premise ‘All bachelors are unhygienic’. 
Note further that in (5) – (6) Kalhat has substituted for (1) and (2) my analysis of what 
it is to call (1) and (2) true.  That substitution is illicit. For I also suggested that the 
application of the truth-predicate assimilates the analytic proposition to an empirical 
proposition (Glock 2003: 163-4+n5). I am committed to an equivalence between the ‘naked’ 
analytic proposition and the ‘naked’ chess-rule. It holds between the role of (1) for the 
inference from ‘Kant is a bachelor’ to ‘Kant is unmarried’ on the one hand, and the role of (2) 
for the inference from ‘You have moved the chess-king more than one square at a time’ to 
‘You have made an incorrect move’ on the other. In both cases, there is as yet no reason to 
accept that a relation of logical or conceptual implication obtains independently of whether 
(1) and (2), respectively, have a normative status.  
 As a result, Kalhat’s first line of attack boils down to two objections. The first is that 
statements like (3) would be ‘logical monsters’ rather than tautologies if they mixed factual 
and normative propositions. But it remains to be shown that this fear is more than superstition. 
Why shouldn’t one preserve the distinction between factual and normative propositions, while 
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recognizing that the common applicability of ‘true’ signals, among other things, that the two 
can be combined e.g. in conditionals like (3)? 
 A parallel defence is available for another notorious claim by Wittgenstein, namely 
that first-person psychological utterances are expressive rather than descriptive. It has been 
objected that such utterances can combine with and stand in logical relations to descriptive 
utterances. Thus 
(7) I am in pain 
occurs in molecular statements like 
(8) I am in pain, and the doctor has not come. 
Moreover, it can function as a premise in a valid inference, e.g. 
(9) I am in pain; therefore someone is in pain. 
Both points indicate that (7) is capable of being true or false. It does not follow, however, that 
it is purely descriptive. Its status is the same as that of a description (‘He is in pain’, 
‘Someone is in pain’) for the purposes of transformations that preserve truth-value. It need not 
for that reason be the same for all purposes. Thus the truth of a statement like (7) is 
guaranteed by the sincerity of the speaker. Accordingly, calling an avowal ‘true’ amounts to 
something different from calling a description ‘true’, even though both are truth-apt in a 
shared minimal sense which ensures that they can stand in logical relations (Glock 1996a: 50-
4). By the same token, a grammatical proposition ‘true’ may amount to something different 
from calling an empirical proposition true, even though both are truth-apt in the minimal 
sense that they can combine in well-formed propositions and can stand in logical relations. 
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3. Arbitrariness vs. Necessary Truth 
The second objection which emerges from Kalhat’s discussion of normative truth is that 
Wittgenstein’s account cannot do justice to the necessity of propositions like (1). Normative 
truth attaches to rules (or rule-formulations) that are in force. Furthermore, since grammatical 
rules are arbitrary, they might not be in force. Accordingly, ‘normatively construed, the truth 
predicate could fail to apply to necessary propositions (in those cases where qua rules they 
fail to be in force). Yet insofar as these propositions are necessary, the truth predicate simply 
could not have failed to apply to them. In calling them “necessary” we mean precisely that 
they could not possibly fail to be true. They could not possibly fail to be true whatever their 
truth amounts to’ (p.12).  
 This passage eloquently expresses the realist sentiment concerning necessary 
propositions. As a criticism of Wittgenstein, however, it begs the question. For Wittgenstein 
challenges that sentiment by maintaining that the idiom of ‘necessarily true’ disguises the 
actual role of the propositions concerned. He grants that in calling propositions like (1) 
necessary or necessarily true, we accord them a special status. But he claims that this special 
status is not simply being true plus being true eternally or in all possible worlds. Rather, it 
means that we would not count anything as refuting a necessary proposition. Not their truth, 
but rather their necessity depends on this normative status. The way we use ‘bachelor’ has no 
immediate impact on the marital status of people. But it can have an impact on whether the 
term ‘married bachelor’ can meaningfully be applied to someone. Accordingly, certain 
propositions can lose their normative status, the status to which their necessity boils down to. 
 That may sound implausible. But there are pertinent examples that suggest otherwise 
(see Baker/Hacker 1985: ch. VIII). Statements that were regarded as paradigms of necessary 
truth, such as Euclid’s 5th axiom or the claim that there cannot be negative numbers have not 
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just been stripped of their necessary status, they have been rejected altogether. Kalhat would 
presumably regard this as a merely epistemological complication. We can be mistaken as to 
what truths hold in all possible worlds. But even if the progress of mathematics involved 
increased knowledge of a modal realm, this would not explain all the cases in which 
necessary propositions have been abandoned. If it were a truth about that realm that there are 
negative as well as positive numbers, it would be one so basic that it should have been 
obvious to mathematical geniuses like Euclid or Eudoxos. The progress concerning negative 
numbers consists not in a new discovery about an abstract reality, but in the realization of the 
power of a novel system of calculation.  
 Kalhat takes up the incompatibility of necessity and arbitrariness once more in section 
4. There he dwells on Wittgenstein’s suggestion that the nature of colours is determined by 
grammatical rules such as  
(10) Nothing can be red and green all over 
If (10) is of our own making, then the nature of colours must be as well. At the same time, the 
colours themselves are not of our own making. 
However, if we have not created the colours red and green, how could we have 
nevertheless created their nature? For what sense attaches to the idea that red and green 
could have existed without having the properties that make them the colours that they 
are? That would be to say that red and green could have existed without being them! 
Since the nature of red and green cannot thus be of our own making, then either the 
grammatical proposition ‘Nothing can be red and green all over’ is not constitutive of the 
nature of the colours red and green, or else it is not of our own making (p.18). 
One might try to defuse this dilemma through a ‘deflationary’ construal of nature or essence: 
colours and their properties exist independently of us, yet ‘we decide, in accordance with our 
interests and needs, which of the colours’ properties to treat as constitutive of them’. But this 
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would imply that a decision of ours might yield the result that the colour red is compatible 
with the colour green, which is absurd. As Kalhat acknowledges, Wittgenstein himself does 
not go down that road, since he treats colour incompatibility as constitutive of colour. His 
only option, according to Kalhat, is to go the full hog and insist that we create both the 
colours and their natures: while objects were coloured before human beings developed a 
colour vocabulary, they were not red. Kalhat rightly demurs that this is incompatible with the 
fact that an object cannot be coloured without having a particular colour. Furthermore, 
Wittgenstein cannot claim that the very concept of colour depends on us. Even if thoughts 
about colour presuppose concepts of our own making, we can fashion colour concepts only 
because we can discriminate different colours. And this implies a realistic position about 
colours and their natures, that is, the position that Wittgenstein seeks to avoid (pp.19-22). 
 But what does it mean to say that colours exist independently of us? It means that the 
concepts we use do not alter any of the pertinent facts about objects, notably their visual 
appearance. For instance, they do not render hitherto colourless objects coloured (red, green, 
etc.). Yet those facts can be stated only in terms of concepts which, at least according to 
Wittgenstein, are of our own making. There is an indefinite number of facts involving objects 
which could in principle be stated; for there is an indefinite number of properties that objects 
possess. Only some of these properties are such that creatures of our cognitive and perceptual 
capacities can notice or ascertain them. And of these, only some are captured by our concepts, 
and hence feature in our statements. 
 Whatever Wittgenstein himself thought about the matter, our colour concepts are not 
arbitrary in the sense that we have a free choice. For they depend on our perceptual capacities, 
which in turn reflect universal biological features of the human visual apparatus. But this does 
not mean that statements of colour geometry like (10) are forced on us by the nature of colour, or 
even by certain anthropological constants. Nothing about coloured objects or our sense-organs 
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prevents us from devising and employing a vocabulary in which objects of certain intermediate 
shades, or objects that oscillate rapidly between different colours, are said to have two colours all 
over at the same time. What is determined by grammar is not nature in the sense of the causal 
properties which are responsible for the way coloured objects affect our perceptual apparatus. 
Instead, at least according to Wittgenstein, what is determined by grammar is nature in the sense 
of those features which give rise to a priori, conceptual inferences. There is no incompatibility 
between granting that objects are coloured independently of us and insisting that the rules 
constitutive of the concept of colour are determined by our linguistic practices. What concepts 
we adopt depends (to degrees that vary according to the area of discourse) on our objective 
exigencies in an objective world; yet this does not mean that it is dictated by metaphysical 
essences. By the same token, one can acknowledge that any number of facts obtain 
independently of us, while insisting that no such facts obtain necessarily. 
 
4. The goal of language 
At the same time there is a problem with the idea that grammatical rules are arbitrary which 
Kalhat does not pick up on. As he explains, in Wittgenstein this idea is to bring out that 
grammatical rules are ‘determined neither by the nature of reality, nor by some goal that is 
conceptually independent of them’ (p.5). The last point alludes to a contrast with the rules of 
cooking. The concept of cooking is defined by its goal, the production of edible or tasty food 
(depending on whether one approaches the issue from a British or continental perspective). 
This goal is specifiable independently of the rules of cooking, and hence those rules can be 
justified by reference to the extent to which they expedite the attainment of that goal. 
 By contrast, Wittgenstein insists, the concept of language is not defined by an 
independent goal. Instead, the grammatical rules are constitutive of the concept of language, 
and the goal of language is not independent of the concept of language. It is natural to take 
Necessity and Language PI 2008: 17/11/2008, 11:08:18 
 
10 
language to serve the goal of communication. But according to Wittgenstein, the concept of 
language is already contained in that of communication. This claim runs counter to 
established use, in which we distinguish between linguistic communication and non-linguistic 
communication, e.g. through gestures and facial expressions.  
 Schwyzer defends Wittgenstein by arguing that coordination through signals counts as 
communication only if it involves language. If John tries to lure Mary to his side by crying, 
this counts either as a mere case of ‘vocal netting or lassoing’ (2001: 293), or as a case in 
which John speaks to Mary. But this dichotomy is incomplete. John communicates with Mary 
if he intentionally conveys his thoughts (beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.) to her. Mary does not 
come to his side through a mechanical reaction to a stimulus, but because she has understood 
the point of John’s cry. Nevertheless such communication is not linguistic. Mary has not 
understood the meaning of a conventional sign; rather, she has understood a desire conveyed 
through a natural expression. 
 Wittgenstein and Schwyzer are wrong, therefore, to suggest that communication is per 
se linguistic. This by itself does not show, however, that the goal of communication is a 
necessary precondition of a language. It only shows that languages are not the only means of 
communication. Furthermore, even if being suitable for communication were a necessary 
precondition of language, this would not necessarily undermine the autonomy claim. For it is 
as yet unclear how the goal of communication could favour one set of communally sharable 
grammatical rules over another. 
 
5. Being about 
Kalhat objects to the idea that what is about a number in the sense in which ‘The sofa is blue’ 
is about the sofa is never a mathematical proposition like ‘2 + 2 = 4’, but rather a proposition 
like ‘There are 2 people on the sofa’ (Baker/Hacker 1985: 282). He objects that ‘the latter is a 
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proposition about the number of people (on the sofa), not about the number 2 itself!’. Yet this 
is an unwarranted dichotomy. For that sentence can be analysed à la Frege as ‘2 = the number 
of people on the sofa’. And in that case it is about the number 2, precisely because it is about 
the number of people on the sofa. 
 In any event, the main gist of Kalhat’s objection is that a necessary statement cannot 
both be about, e.g., numbers and colours and be a rule for the use of words. A look at the rules 
of chess suggests otherwise, however. (2) is both about the chess-king and a rule for the use of 
the chess king. Kalhat might question the analogy. For in the chess case, the rule guides the 
use of what it is about. In the linguistic case, by contrast, the rule guides words, yet it is 
supposed to be about what those words denote. Wittgenstein would respond, however, that the 
sense in which numerals like ‘2’ denote numbers is a special one. Numbers are what numerals 
denote or signify, but the meaning of numerals is given not by a mental pointing at entities 
beyond space and time, but by specifying the rules for their use (see Glock 1996a: 264-8).  
 Kalhat next contends that if a grammatical proposition like  
(11) All mares are female horses  
is constitutive of the meaning of the word ‘mare’, then it should in some sense be about that 
word (p.14). But I don’t see why this should be the case. The so-called central paragraphs are 
constitutive of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany not just in the 
mereological sense, but also in the sense that they define that particular body of laws 
irrespective of its overall composition at any given time. They are explicitly specified to be 
unalterable, and hence no legal codex that lacks them can be that constitution. And yet these 
paragraphs are not about the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. Furthermore, 
there is a sense in which (11) is about the word ‘mare’: it is standardly used as rule for the use 
of that word. If you say ‘I own a mare that is male’, I can correct and inform you by uttering 
(11). 
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 Kalhat also maintains that as a grammatical rule (11) would have to be equivalent to   
(12) The English word ‘mare’ applies to all and only female horses  
This, he protests, is wrong, since unlike (11), (12) is a meta-linguistic statement and hence 
contingent (p.15). 
 Admittedly, (12) can be used as an empirical proposition, as what von Wright calls a 
‘norm proposition’ (1963: viii). In that case it is a statement to the effect that a community (in 
our case the community of Anglophones) follows certain linguistic rules (in our case the rule 
of applying ‘mare’ only to female horses and accepting its application to all and only female 
horses). But (12) can also be used normatively, as the expression of a constitutive rule of 
English. In that case, it is not an empirical proposition which is falsified e.g. by someone who 
applies ‘mare’ to male horses, or female foxes, or nightmares. Its dependence on the 
contingent behaviour of Anglophones is indirect: if everybody violated the rule and nobody 
accepted corrections of such violations, then the rule would no longer be in force. Certain 
contingent regularities are part of the framework for our linguistic activities, as Wittgenstein 
stressed (see Glock 1996a: 135-9). 
 Note that the phrasing of both (11) and (12) suggests an extensional equivalence rather 
than an intensional one. This connotation is avoided by a definitional proposition like 
(13) Mares are female horses. 
At the meta-linguistic level we can achieve this effect e.g. by inserting ‘by definition’ into (9).  
(14) The English word ‘mare’ applies by definition to all and only female horses. 
This reveals a further point in favour of a linguistic conception. One would expect that (11) 
and (12) come apart simply on the grounds that someone can know what (11) expresses 
without knowing what (12) expresses. But it is at any rate a moot question whether, for 
instance, a monoglot Germanophone who knows that Mähre applies to all and only female 
horses can therefore be said to know that mares are female horses.  (13), not to mention (14), 
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is tied too closely to linguistic understanding for us to feel comfortable in saying so. By 
contrast, we have no hesitation to say that a monoglot Germanophone can know that all mares 
eat grass. 
 
6. Truth by virtue of meaning 
Kalhat considers a different way out of the quandary. Though still meta-linguistic, (11) will 
not come out as a contingent truth if it is about a ‘symbol’ rather than a mere ‘sign’, in the 
terminology of the Tractatus (3.12). In that case (11) does not pronounce on the contingent 
application of ‘mare’, construed as a mere inscription or sound pattern, but ‘on the 
application of “mare” construed as the inscription/ sound pattern together with its meaning’. 
(11) would then say that the symbol ‘mare’, ‘which means female horse, applies to all and 
only female horses. And it is unclear that a word with that meaning could correctly apply to 
anything other than female horses’ (p.16). 
 Kalhat rejects this way out on two interconnected grounds. The first is that in talking 
about a sign ‘together with its meaning’, it comes close to treating meanings as objects 
associated with words, a view which Wittgenstein himself castigated as the idea of ‘meaning-
bodies’ that stand behind our expressions and their use. Kalhat does not regard this objection 
as serious, since the proposal can be ‘reformulated in terms of use rather than meaning 
(Wittgenstein, after all, took use to determine meaning …)’. Presumably, the reformulation 
runs somewhat as follows: (11) is not contingent, because the sign used in the way we actually 
do could not apply to anything other than female horses. 
 Unfortunately, this gives rise to a problem that Kalhat considers fatal. 
If we construe [12] as pronouncing on the application of the word ‘mare’, when 
the latter is taken together with its meaning, then it seems that far from 
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constituting the meaning of that word, [12] in fact presupposes that meaning, and 
simply proceeds to record it. But in that case, [11] cannot be equivalent to [12], 
for [11] is supposed to be constitutive of the meaning of the word ‘mare’ –that, 
after all, is why [11] is supposed to be about the word ‘mare’ in the first place! 
(pp.16-7). 
The equivalence between [11] and [12] is not the real sticking-point. For one can insist that 
they are equivalent, irrespectively of whether one treats both as constituting the meaning of 
‘mare’ or both as recording it. They will be equivalent for Wittgenstein’s purposes if they 
fulfil a similar function, namely of explaining the meaning of ‘mare’. 
 The real difficulty lies in how to construe such explanations. If we treat them as 
recording the meaning of expressions, we seem to abandon a crucial difference between 
Wittgenstein’s account and that of the logical positivists. Following several commentators 
(Baker/Hacker 1985: 267-9, 341; Glock 1996b: 207; Boghossian 1997: 348), Kalhat credits 
Wittgenstein with an alternative version of conventionalism: necessary propositions do not 
follow from the meaning of their constituents, they partly constitute that meaning (pp.2, 16). 
But if they record meanings, it seems that they cannot at the same time constitute it. 
 But why should a conventionalist opt for Wittgenstein’s alternative rather than that of 
the logical positivists? Because the idea that necessary propositions follow from the meaning 
of their constituents is supposed to fall prey to powerful arguments developed independently 
by Wittgenstein and Quine. Waismann combined these two strands. As he pointed out, the 
phrase ‘true by virtue of meaning’ is prima facie puzzling, since it is unclear how a 
proposition could follow from a meaning rather than from another proposition (1968: 124-5). 
Quine associated the phrase with the ‘myth of a museum’ (1969, 27, see 19), Wittgenstein with 
the picture of ‘meaning-bodies’ (1974: 52-8). What they condemn under these titles is the idea 
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that there are meanings – abstract entities or mental processes – which coerce us (either 
psychologically or rationally) to hold on to analytic propositions, come what may. 
 In fact, the logical positivists recognized perfectly well that signs do not have meaning 
intrinsically, but only as a result of conventions, i.e. of our using them in a certain way. 
Without Platonist and mentalist myths ,the idea of truth by virtue of meaning seems to boil 
down to the claim that necessary propositions are true by virtue of definition: they follow from 
the definitions, or, more loosely, the explanations, of their constituents. 
 Wittgenstein rejected even this seemingly innocuous idea. But his animadversions are 
uncompelling (Glock 1996a: 239-41; cp. Baker/Hacker 1985: 312-8). Wittgenstein challenged 
the idea that the tautologies and the associated rules of inference follow from the truth-tabular 
definitions of the logical constants. Rules of inference, he informs us, determine the meaning of 
the logical constants, rather than proceed from them. Whether a specific transformation of 
symbols is licensed or not is one aspect of the correct use and hence of the meaning of the terms 
involved. That we use ‘p = ~~p’ as a rule of inference contributes to the meaning of ‘~’. Without 
that rule the sign would not have the meaning it has. And if the rule were changed, if we 
accepted instead ‘~~p = ~p’ the meaning of ‘~’ would change correspondingly. Accordingly, the 
rules of inference cannot correspond or fail to correspond to the meaning of e.g. negation. 
Someone who passes let us say from ‘~~p’ to ‘~p’ does not follow a false rule of negation, but 
has given a different meaning to ‘~’ (1953: 147n; 1978: 398). 
 However, to say that ‘~~p = p’ follows from the truth-tabular definition of ‘~’ can be 
understood innocuously as the contrapositive of Wittgenstein's own claim. From Wittgenstein's 
claim that if we alter the rule we alter the meaning it follows that if we do not alter the meaning, 
we get the rule. Furthermore, although we could use ‘~’ according to either ‘~~p = p’ or ‘~~p = 
~p’, it would be inconsistent to combine our truth-tabular explanation of it with the second rule. 
For in that case we would say that the truth-table has been misunderstood--as every logic-tutor 
Necessity and Language PI 2008: 17/11/2008, 11:08:18 
 
16 
will confirm. By Wittgenstein's own lights, the truth-tabular explanation is a rule, and to accept 
‘~~p = ~p’ is a criterion for having misunderstood that rule, because one is not applying the same 
operation--that of reversing the truth-value--to ~p that has been applied to p. 
 Wittgenstein replies ‘Who says what “the same thing” is’ (1976: 180). What he has in 
mind is that the rule follows from the explanation only if it is understood that in the truth-table 
the place of p can be taken by ‘~p’, i.e. that in applying negation to ‘~p’ we reverse the truth-
value of a proposition rather than operating on an operation. Wittgenstein illustrates the 
difference through brackets: the first—and standard--option corresponds to ‘~(~p)’, the second to 
‘(~~)p’. Accordingly, ‘~~p = p’ is not to be determined by the truth-table definition alone, but 
only in conjunction with this second rule. Since there is no comparable rule in natural languages, 
nothing determines how to understand ‘I ain't done nothing’ (1976: 184). But this is not a general 
objection to the idea that explanations—if necessary in combination--can render a proposition 
true. ‘The rules/grammatical propositions determine the meaning’ is as wrong as ‘The meaning 
determines the rules/grammatical propositions’. Understanding the truth-tabular explanation and 
acknowledging ‘~~p = p’ are simply internally related aspects of one and the same practice of 
using ‘~’. The truth-table would mean something different in a practice in which the rule is 
rejected. Both are simply two different rules which make up our practice. 
 Another qualm about the very idea of truth by virtue of meaning or convention goes 
back to C.I. Lewis and C. Lewy. It seems that for any sentence s, s is true iff for some p, s 
says that p and p. All that conventions do is to determine what a sentence says; whether what 
it says is true is another question, to which linguistic conventions are irrelevant. Therefore, a 
sentence cannot owe its truth-value exclusively to meaning or conventions (Boghossian 1997: 
335-7). A related worry has exercised some Wittgensteinians. What could it mean for a 
convention to create a truth? Of course, we can choose to assume that a certain proposition is 
true, in the course of constructing hypotheses, or for the sake of argument. But this does not 
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render that proposition true. In the sense in which, for example, the fact that the cat is on the 
mat might be said to render true the statement that the cat is on the mat, conventions cannot be 
said to render anything true. The only truths conventions could ‘create’ are truths such as ‘In 
1795 France adopted the metric system’, which are precisely not true by convention 
(Baker/Hacker 1985, 234; Glock 2003: 158-9). To that extent Kalhat seems right in excluding 
the positivist option. 
 At least one Wittgensteinian, however, begs to differ. Schroeder (2006: 242-3) makes 
out a clear and prima facie attractive case for insisting that there is nothing mysterious about 
the idea of truth in virtue of meanings or conventions, once we attend to suitable examples. 
Thus: 
(15) ‘A tandem’ means: a bicycle with two seats 
is true because the word ‘tandem’ does mean a bicycle with two seats. The same goes for the 
definitional truth 
(16) A tandem is a bicycle with two seats 
which has the same function and can also be verified simply by looking up the meaning of 
‘tandem’ in a dictionary (assuming standard meaning for the other components). 
 Schroeder also addresses the worry that a conventionalist account turns necessary 
propositions into mere stipulations without a truth-value. This holds true of original 
stipulations, which ‘give a meaning’ to expressions, but not of propositions like (16) which 
‘report correctly what meaning [“tandem”] has in English’. In this context Schroeder takes 
me to task for maintaining (in line with Wittgenstein, incidentally) that analytic-cum-
grammatical propositions partly determine or constitute the meaning of the words involved. 
‘The meaning of the English word “tandem” is completely independent of what I may say: 
What “partly constitutes” the meaning of the word “tandem” is not the statement (16), but the 
linguistic convention that such a statement reflects’. 
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 In one respect, this is a misunderstanding of the Wittgensteinian position. It makes 
meaning dependent not on what individual speakers ‘may say’, but on whether we use certain 
sentences as standards of correctness, rather than as factual statements. To that extent, there is 
no real conflict, even though Schroeder’s reminder of the dependency of analytic propositions 
on a convention is salutary. In another respect, the term ‘reflect’ conceals precisely the 
difficulty highlighted by Kalhat. Schroeder himself spells it out by saying that analytic 
propositions ‘describe’ games or ‘report correctly’ what meaning expressions have in a 
particular language. In that case, however, it would seem that these propositions must be 
empirical and contingent rather than necessary. 
 A way out of the quandary has already been intimated. Unlike norm propositions, 
analytic propositions do not just talk about a practice, they are part of it. They constitute 
meaning rather than simply record or follow from it. They are normative statements in line 
with a practice which, in its entirety, determines the meaning of the word. Both the 
applications and the explanations of words by individual speakers are responsible to this 
established practice (unless they deliberately diverge from it). Analytic propositions are 
‘normatively true’ in that they express (rather than describe or state the existence of) 
conventions that are actually in place in a particular linguistic community. At the same time, 
those conventions would not exist if the community adopted different conventions, that is, if it 
adopted different explanations or consistently tolerated behaviour at odds with the old one. 
 
7. What we cannot say 
The final two sections of Kalhat’s paper pursue a different target: even if Wittgenstein’s 
conventionalist account were adequate, the assimilation of necessary propositions to 
grammatical rules would nevertheless fail to reduce the notion of necessity to a non-modal 
notion. 
Necessity and Language PI 2008: 17/11/2008, 11:08:18 
 
19 
 Kalhat rightly notes that Wittgenstein is associated with anti-reductionism. 
Nonetheless he regards his ‘assimilation of necessary propositions to grammatical 
propositions’ as a reductive explanation, in so far as a modal concept is explained in ‘non-
modal … normative terms’ (p.3). What is correct is that Wittgenstein tries to demystify 
necessary propositions and modal notions. Moreover, he regards the traditional idea that 
necessary mirror de re essences or modal features of reality as mystifying. Consequently, 
Kalhat is right in holding that he would not be happy to explain necessary propositions as 
grammatical rules if this meant granting that the latter mirror essences or modal features of 
reality (pp. 23-4). What is crucial to Wittgenstein’s enterprise, however, is not the reductionist 
aspiration of analysing away modal notions, but an account which avoids any reliance on 
metaphysical necessities. These observations do not take the sting out of Kalhat’s last two 
sections. For if he is right, Wittgenstein’s account relies on modal connections which he has 
not accounted for, and which perhaps cannot be accounted for in linguistic terms. We face the 
threat of unexplained metaphysical necessities. 
 According to Wittgenstein, the use of a word determines its meaning. We could not, 
therefore, use the words ‘red’ and ‘green’ to characterise the same object without thereby 
changing their meaning. But in that case, Kalhat reasons 
the necessity of the proposition ‘Nothing can be red and green all over’ reduces to 
the fact, not that we never use the words ‘red’ and ‘green’ to characterise the same 
portion of an object, but to the fact that we could not use these words in that way. 
For the very attempt to do so would violate the grammatical rule that is itself 
constitutive of their meaning (viz., ‘Nothing can be red and green all over’), and 
the words would thereby cease to have the meaning that they do (p.25). 
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He acknowledges that Wittgenstein deliberately tried to avoid modal notions in his account. 
‘Do not say “one cannot”, but say instead: “it doesn’t exist in this game”. Not: “one can’t 
castle in draughts” but – “there is no castling in draughts”’ (1967: §134). But, Kalhat 
intercedes, Wittgenstein’s explanation of why ‘there is no castling in draughts’ and why ‘there 
is no such thing as enumerating all the members’ is willy-nilly modal, since it implies that it is 
‘impossible to say things like “It is generally a good idea to castle as early as possible in a 
game of draughts”, and mean what we ordinarily mean by the expression “to castle”’ (p.26). 
Hence Wittgenstein’s linguistic analysis requires modal claims rather than dispensing with 
them. 
 Let me rephrase this objection. Of course we might start uttering sentences like 
(17)  The Tower is red and green all over 
Nevertheless it would remain impossible to say that this rose is red and green all over, since in 
(17) at least one of the constituent terms no longer means what it now does, and hence the 
oratio obliqua construction would be inaccurate. By the same token, we might begin to play a 
board game which is like chess, except that the queen must be moved when it is threatened. 
Nevertheless, it would remain impossible to check the queen in chess, since this board-game 
would no longer be chess and the piece at issue no longer the (chess-)queen. 
 The objection is connected to two other lines of criticism. The first is part of the 
aforementioned Lewis-Lewy point. One must distinguish the question of whether a sentence 
s, as presently used, expresses an analytic truth from the question of whether the proposition 
that is at present expressed by s is an analytic truth. Granted, if it pleased us to apply the terms 
‘red all over’ and ‘green all over’ to one and the same object at the same time, it would no 
longer be true to utter the sentence (10). But the proposition that we now express through (10) 
would still be a necessary truth. Elsewhere I have tried to defuse this objection (2003: 164-8). 
The conventionalist can draw an analogous distinction between a sentence s expressing a 
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particular rule and that rule being in force. If the rule is not in force, then the anti-
conventionalist cannot without petitio principii insist that it is nevertheless necessary that 
nothing can be red and green all over.  
 In the present context, I want to draw a connection to another objection to the 
arbitrariness of grammar. Wittgenstein maintains that there could be alternative grammatical 
systems or ‘forms of representation’. It is perfectly intelligible, for instance, that we should 
adopt different rules of counting, calculating or measuring, such as measuring by the ell. What 
is unintelligible is only the idea of changing our form of representation, while retaining our 
present concepts (Baker/Hacker 1985: 327). But, Wright objects, if different techniques make for 
different concepts, what entitles Wittgenstein to speak of alternative forms e.g. of measuring 
(1980: 67-72). Strictly speaking, it seems, while one can behave differently, one cannot adopt a 
different way of measuring. 
 In my view, we can call measuring by the ell a form of measuring, in spite of the fact 
that some of the ‘constitutive’ rules differ. For there is sufficient overlap in these rules, and 
the alternative practice plays an analogous role in the form of life of those who pursue it. The 
idea of rules constituting a practice or meaning or concepts must not be understood too 
rigidly. Otherwise we can no longer make sense of conceptual change. To be sure, there are 
conceptual limits to revising grammar.  While our concepts of counting, measuring etc. are 
flexible enough to accommodate certain variations, there is a much tighter link between the ‘laws 
of logic’ and notions like ‘reasoning’, ‘thinking’, and even ‘proposition’ or ‘language’ (1978: 80, 
89-95, 336; 1976: 201-2, 214). A practice which does not conform to the rule for the modus 
ponens simply does not qualify as inferring. And a system which allows the derivation of a 
contradiction does not count as an alternative logic. However, these limits are set not by Platonic 
entities, as Frege had it, or by a ‘metalogical’ obligation to avoid contradictions, as the logical 
positivists thought, but by our concepts, by what we call ‘inferring’, ‘reasoning’, or ‘(system of) 
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rules’ (1974: 111, 304). The rules for the use of these terms pay no more heed to reality than 
those of other words; rather a practice which does not conform to them would be unintelligible to 
us, and would not count as a language. 
 By this token, some modifications to the rules for ‘red’ and ‘green’ are perfectly 
compatible with treating them as colour terms expressing colour concepts. Whether 
abandoning (10) is one of those is a moot point. If so, then one can say that the Tower is red 
and green all over (e.g. when it is subjected to a supremely weird light display on the occasion 
of the inevitable 75th Jubilee of Elizabeth II). In any event, Wittgenstein’s ultimate response to 
Kalhat derives from his denial of metalogical necessities. Whether ‘red’ and ‘green’ would 
still count as colour terms, and hence whether it is possible to say that something can be red 
and green all over is once more determined not by a surplus metaphysical necessity, but by 
what we do and do not allow in our linguistic practice. Even if Kalhat is right to regard (10) as 
crucial to colour concepts, the result can be formulated without appeal to unexplained 
modalities. 
 Do not say ‘One cannot say that the Tower is red and green all over’, but say instead 
‘Saying that the Tower is red and green all over doesn’t exist in this game’. 
 
8. What rules demand 
Kalhat could deny that this response defuses the threat of surplus necessity, at least as long as 
what does and does not exist in the game is explained in terms of grammatical rules. For the 
notion of a rule is itself modal in nature. Indeed, Kalhat reasons in his final section, this 
follows from Wittgenstein’s own insistence that it is essential to the notion of a rule that 
something counts as following the rule and something as going against it. 
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The consistency of a rule R and an action A comes down to the fact that it is 
possible to follow R and perform A. And the inconsistency of a rule R* and an 
action A* comes down to the fact that it is impossible to follow R* and perform 
A*. If all possible linguistic behaviour were consistent with a rule, then it would 
just not be a rule. So, in order for something to be a rule, some of its applications 
must be consistent with it, and some must be inconsistent with it. But the notion 
of consistency is evidently a modal notion. Therefore, to the extent that this notion 
plays a vital role in characterising the very concept of a grammatical rule, the 
latter is itself modal in nature (p.27). 
Kalhat considers the response that the connection between a rule and its application is 
‘internal’, i.e. constitutive of the rule. He denies that this solves the problem. For if anyone 
who steps out of line were simply following a different rule, then there would be no such 
thing as following a rule incorrectly. The difficulty is not allayed by holding that the internal 
connection holds between ‘the rule and the on-reflection-acceptable application of it’. For that 
latter notion presupposes that the rule-follower can recognize a mistake, which is to say an 
action inconsistent with a rule she intends to follow. Nor can the idea of an action which is 
inconsistent with the rule be reduced to an action which we in fact count as inconsistent. For 
there is an indefinite number of actions which we would count as violations of the rule. At 
most, an inconsistent application is one which runs counter to ‘the way we are in fact disposed 
to apply the rule’. But the notion of a disposition is itself modal in nature, since it is the notion 
of how we would apply the rule in non-actual (yet possible) cases (p. 29).  
 At one level, this objection can countered in the same manner as the previous one. 
There is no need for an extra layer of necessity. There is an internal connection between a rule 
and its application, i.e. between the rule-formulation and our practice of calling such-and-such 
‘obeying’ or ‘going against it’. The internal relation is not to be explained in terms of 
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dispositions. As Wittgenstein pointed out, this would undermine its normative status. Instead it is 
to be explained in terms of an open-ended practice. The fact that a rule covers an indefinite or 
infinite number of cases should not mystify us and lead us down the garden path to the Platonic 
picture of rails to infinity. In fact, what would really be mysterious is a rule which covers only a 
limited number of cases, without such a limitation being specified in its formulation. 
At a different level, Kalhat’s objection takes us to the heart of unresolved issues about 
rule-following. For it is no mean feat to explain how our practice sustains an internal relation 
between rule and application. We have yet to steer entirely clear of the Scylla of Platonism and 
the Charybdis of rule-scepticism. Wittgenstein, for all the genius he displayed in dealing with 
rule-following, often veered dangerously close to the latter, for instance in his attack on meaning-
bodies. 
Fortunately, even without a completely satisfactory account of rule-following one can 
question the ultimate morale that Kalhat derives from his last argument. He relies on the 
assumption that normative concepts would have to be ‘non-modal’ in order for a conventionalist 
account to work. This assumption is mistaken. The primary use of modal terms like ‘must’, 
‘must not’ and ‘can’ is obviously a normative one (see White 1975). The moot points are two. 
First, is the modality involved logical or conceptual, i.e. of the kind involved in logical or 
analytic truths; secondly, is the latter modality metaphysical, i.e. grounded in abstract entities or 
essences located in a reality independent of human practices. Rule-following may be inherently 
modal in that it involves modal notions; yet these modal notions need not be of the metaphysical 
kind, and they may in turn be inherently connected to normative practice. Thus Anscombe 
(1978) suggested that there is a special and primitive variety of necessity, found in all rule-
governed activities, such as games. In the context of such activities ‘You have to’ (‘You're 
meant to’, etc.) involves a ‘forcing modal’, which expresses a kind of necessity, and ‘You 
can't’ involves a ‘stopping-modal, which expresses a kind of impossibility. If a child says 
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‘Why can't I do that?’, we answer by referring to a rule, for instance ‘Because your king is in 
check’, and ultimately by saying things like ‘Because it's against the rules’.  Neither modals 
nor rules are more basic, they are ultimately both facets of normative practices in which we 
encourage and discourage certain activities. ‘In the beginning was the deed!’, as Wittgenstein 
was fond of quoting Goethe, not recherché metaphysical necessities. 
 
9. The Negative Case 
Of course this last statement stands in need of defence. But the best defence may lie in 
attacking the metaphysical alternative. In recent years, Wittgensteinians have shielded his 
provocative claims about necessity with great ingenuity against some of prima facie 
compelling objections. But they have failed to stress sufficiently the attractions of a broadly 
speaking conventionalist account in comparison to realist alternatives. Wittgenstein’s so-
called rule-following considerations provide powerful arguments against certain Platonistic 
conceptions of rule-following. They do not refute Platonist conceptions of necessary 
propositions as statements about abstract objects beyond space and time. Even less do they 
refute the Aristotelian idea that necessary propositions are statements about de re necessities 
sustained by the essential features of our non-abstract world. 
 Yet general and weighty objections to the very idea of de re metaphysical necessity are 
to be found in Kant, as well as in thinkers that are surprisingly close to him on that score, 
namely the logical positivists. Kant’s basic insight is this: de re necessities of which we can 
become aware independently of experience are mystifying, to say the least, provided that 
experience is our way of getting in touch with reality. Recent commentators notwithstanding, 
this challenge in no way relies on Kant’s own transcendental idealism. Nor has it been 
superseded by Kripke’s and Putnam’s rehabilitation of real essences (Glock 2002). Modal 
claims of the relevant kind are tied not to investigations of the world, but to the way we 
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individuate and conceptualize the world. There is nothing necessary about Plato, Aquinas, 
Kant, Wittgenstein, …, (who happen to be bachelors), being unmarried. One might retort, 
however, that there are underlying de re necessities. For instance, one might insist that it 
necessary that those who are in fact bachelors should be unmarried. But this alleged de re 
formulation once more owes its necessity to the occurrence of the term ‘bachelor’ and to the 
conceptual/semantic implications of the latter. 
 Another plea for the de re nature of necessity hails from White (1975 ch. 11). He 
argues that modal statements of the form ‘It is necessary that X is Y’ and ‘X is necessarily Y’ 
are always de re, in the sense that they are not about the proposition that X is Y (what is 
known as de dicto) but about X’s being Y. Furthermore, that X is necessarily Y does not 
depend on the manner X is referred to (pace linguistic accounts). Kant is necessarily 
unmarried because he is a bachelor, not because we (occasionally) refer to him as a bachelor. 
This is a realist stance Kalhat would underwrite. At the same time White concurs with 
conventionalism in denying that statements of the form ‘X is necessarily Y’ imply the 
existence of peculiar modal properties like X being necessarily Y. Rather, they signify a 
relation between X and other items involved in the situation. It is because of or qua being a 
bachelor that Kant is necessarily unmarried. 
 But now we have to scrutinize the nature of this specific ‘because of’ or ‘qua’. It is 
conceptual rather than factual or intentional, as in modal statements of a different kind (‘It is 
qua Prussian that Kant must have been a pedant’, ‘It is qua analgesic that cancer patients need    
morphine’). White himself explicitly distinguishes what he regards as standard modal 
statements of the form ‘It is necessary that X is Y’ or ‘X is necessarily Y’ from necessary 
truths like ‘~ (p & ~p)’, ‘9 > 7’ or analytic truths like (1). Whereas the former have their truth 
necessitated by something else, White informs us, necessary truths ‘have their truth 
necessitated by themselves’; they are ‘true in themselves’ (1975: 94, 170). This is in fact 
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hospitable to the linguistic account. Kant is necessarily unmarried because he is a bachelor 
and because the meaning of bachelor guarantees that all bachelors are unmarried. Whether it 
is conceptually necessary that an individual is unmarried depends on the articulation of our 
concepts. That much seems to me to be reflective common sense. By contrast, I remain 
puzzled by the idea of de re metaphysical necessities independent of our conceptual apparatus 
which nonetheless we somehow manage to get into the haircrosses of our intellectual 
periscopes.  
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